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Abstract 
Using linked employer-employee data from the German Structure of Earnings Survey 2001, 
this paper provides a comprehensive picture of the wage structure in three wage-setting 
regimes prevalent in the German system of industrial relations. We analyze wage 
distributions for various labor market subgroups by means of kernel density estimation, 
variance decompositions, and individual and firm-level wage regressions. Unions’ impact 
through collective and firm-level bargaining mainly works towards a higher wage level and 
reduced overall and residual wage dispersion. Yet observed effects are considerably 
heterogeneous across different labor market groups. There is no clear evidence for wage 
floors formed by collectively bargained low wage brackets which would operate as minimum 
wages for different groups of workers.  
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1 Introduction
Trade unions bargain for higher wages, equal pay, fair working conditions, or employ-
ment protection (Freeman and Medoff 1984). Classical models such as monopoly unions,
right-to-manage models, or efficient bargaining predict a monotonic positive relation-
ship between union power and the level of bargained wages; see the surveys of Farber
(1986), Oswald (1985), and Naylor (2003). Some more recent studies emphasize effects
on higher moments of the wage distribution. In line with an insurance motive for union
representation of risk-averse workers (Agell and Lommerud 1992, Burda 1995), union im-
pact compresses the wage distribution relative to the distribution of productivities. By
enforcing “equal pay for equal work” unions further seek to limit favoritism and discrim-
ination by superiors and colleagues, and to encourage solidarity among the work force
(Freeman 1982). Union-bargained wages may serve as wage floors, thereby narrowing the
distribution of wages from below.
Collective agreements reflecting unions’ bargaining objectives then have two effects
on the structure of wages. First, differences between covered and non-covered segments
would increase as the result of the unions’ strive for higher wages. Second, wage compres-
sion induced through a collective contract would reduce within-segment inequality. The
question which effect would prevail has been discussed for some time in the Anglo-Saxon
context; see the survey of Card, Lemieux, and Riddell (2003).
However, the Anglo-Saxon concept of union gaps or membership premia is inappropri-
ate for Germany because collective agreements constituting discriminatory wage policies
with disadvantages for non-members are forbidden by constitutional law (negative free-
dom of association, negative Koalitionsfreiheit, Grundgesetz Art. 9 ). The scope of collec-
tive agreements goes beyond the organized parties. Wages set at the firm level as well as
individually bargained wages are adapted towards collective bargaining agreements, be
it in order to reduce transaction costs or not to create incentives for employees to join
a union. Collective bargaining coverage thus is considerably higher than union density.
The decision whether to apply a collective contract or not is basically left to the firms.
In the interpretation of Dustmann and Scho¨nberg (2004), firms use collective agreements
as a commitment device.
Employees are paid either according to individual contracts between the employee
and the firm or according to a collective agreement. The collective agreement can be
negotiated between a union and an employers’ association, a union and a firm, or a works
council and a firm. Arrangements between firm and works council are only allowed to
govern wages or salaries if the firm is not subject to a collective contract or if the collective
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contract explicitly allows for this type of arrangement.1 Firm-level agreements involving
a union are allowed to set wages even if a collective agreement exists, as long as the
firm-level agreement is more specific than the collective agreement. No more than one
collective wage agreement must apply at the same time, but not all employees working
in a firm applying a collective agreement are automatically covered. Collective contracts
may also contain an opening clause explicitly allowing deviations from the terms of the
contract under particular circumstances (Heinbach 2006).
Collective bargaining coverage, as measured by the share of employment contracts fol-
lowing collective agreements, was relatively stable in West Germany until the mid 1990’s
but has been declining since. By the year 2003, 70% (45%) of West German employees
(firms) were covered by a collective agreement (Schnabel 2005). With respective shares
of 47% and 26%, coverage in East Germany was markedly lower.2 The “erosion” towards
more decentralized wage setting is examined by a group of studies using firm-level data,
and is reconfirmed by survey evidence from works councils.3
Evidence on the effects of bargaining coverage on the German wage structure is still
sparse. In this paper we use newly available linked employer-employee data for Germany,
the German Structure of Earnings Survey (GSES, Gehalts- und Lohnstrukturerhebung)
2001, in order to provide a first comprehensive picture of wage structures in the different
bargaining regimes for various labor market subgroups. Broadening the scope of previ-
ous results at the Federal-State level, we compare individual, firm-level, and collective
bargaining among male full-time employees, female full-time, and female part-time em-
ployees, and we distinguish between blue-collar and white-collar workers and between
establishments in East and West Germany.
The thrust of our findings confirms a priori expectations. Union impact through
collective bargaining results in a higher wage level as well as reduced overall and residual
wage dispersion. Yet there is no clear evidence for disproportionate wage compression
from below or a wage floor formed by collectively bargained low wage brackets. Moreover,
we detect considerable heterogeneity of union impacts across different labor market groups
as well as subtle differences between individual and firm-level evidence.
The course of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 briefly reviews related
studies in the literature. Section 3 introduces the GSES 2001 data. Framework and
results of our empirical investigation are discussed in section 4. Section 5 concludes.
1See Addison, Teixeira, and Zwick (2006) for a discussion of the effects of German works councils.
2In contrast, aggregate gross union density—i. e., the ratio of the number of union members and the
number of employees in the German labor market—was only 27% in the year 2004 (Fitzenberger, Kohn,
and Wang 2006).
3Kohaut and Bellmann (1997), Bellmann, Kohaut, and Schnabel (1999), Kohaut and Schnabel (2003b,
2003a), Bispinck and Schulten (2003), Bosch (2004).
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2 Related Literature
Empirical studies of the impact of the different bargaining regimes in Germany have
become feasible with recent years’ growing availability of linked employer-employee data.
Based on linked data of the IAB employment statistics and the IAB establishment panel,
Dustmann and Scho¨nberg (2004) find that under collective coverage, employee turnover
is higher, wage cuts occur more often, and (conditional) wages have a lower variance.
Gu¨rtzgen (2006), also using linked IAB data, reports positive wage premia for industry-
level contracts in West Germany and for firm-level contracts in East Germany.
A couple of studies analyze subsamples of the German Structure of Earnings Sur-
vey (GSES, Gehalts- und Lohnstrukturerhebung). Using different cross sections (1990,
1995, 2001) of the manufacturing subsample for the state of Lower-Saxony, Gerlach and
Stephan (2002, 2006a, 2006c) report kernel density estimates of log wage distributions for
labor market regimes with and without collective and firm-level wage agreements, and
estimate firm-level wage regressions. Average hourly wages paid in accordance with a
collective or a firm-level agreement are higher than the average of individually negoti-
ated wages. Yet unconditional as well as conditional wage dispersion is highest among
individual contracts. Differences between regimes increased between the years 1990 and
2001. Similar results are obtained by Bechtel, Mo¨dinger, and Strotmann (2004) based on
the GSES subsample for the state of Baden-Wu¨rttemberg. Multi-level regression mod-
els in Stephan and Gerlach (2003, 2005) reveal that differences in individual wages are
consistent with a higher base wage in case of collective coverage. Returns to human
capital—skill, experience, and tenure—as well as residual wage dispersion are lower un-
der collective coverage. Gerlach and Stephan (2006b) note that collective agreements
compress within-firm compensation schemes across occupations.
Heinbach (2006) merges the GSES subsample for Baden-Wu¨rttemberg with informa-
tion on the existence of opening clauses in collective agreements. When distinguishing
between collective agreements with and those without opening clauses in firm-level re-
gressions, he finds that mean wages for blue-collar workers in manufacturing are lower
under opening clauses, but no significant wage differences exist for white-collar workers.
Moreover, no significant differences exist regarding wage dispersion as measured by the
standard deviation of wages.
In a companion paper (Fitzenberger, Kohn, and Lembcke 2007) we augment the
GSES 2001 by estimates of union membership taken from Fitzenberger, Kohn, and Wang
(2006) in order to simultaneously study the impacts of both collective bargaining regimes
and union bargaining power as measured by net union density at an aggregate level.4
4Net union density in homogenously defined labor market segments is estimated by average union
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Collective bargaining as well as net union density significantly influence wages. Individual
coverage and union density lower wages, while the firm-level share of covered employees
raises wages. This result corroborates the notion that bargaining coverage and union
density have distinct effects on the German wage structure (cf. Fitzenberger and Kohn
2005).
A collective agreement does not constrain a firm’s right to pay premia above the
wage set in the collective contract. So actual wages may differ substantially from the
contractual wage. This aspect is examined by the wage-drift literature and studies related
to nominal, notional, or real wage rigidity; see, e. g., Bauer, Bonin, and Sunde (2003)
and Pfeiffer (2003). Cardoso and Portugal (2005) analyze the gap between contractual
and actual wages for employees covered by different types of collective agreements in
Portugal.5 They find that the positive effect of union strength—as measured by the share
of covered employees—on the level of contractual wages is partly offset by a smaller wage
cushion. So higher contractual wages in sectors with a high share of covered employees
may not lead to higher actual wages by the same degree.
3 Data
Our study is based on the German Structure of Earnings Survey (GSES, Gehalts- und
Lohnstrukturerhebung) 2001, a cross-sectional linked employer-employee data set contain-
ing about 850,000 employees in some 22,000 firms. Missing essentially the public sector,
the GSES 2001 covers the major part of industry and private services. There are several
advantages to using the GSES 2001. It is one of the largest mandatory surveys available
for Germany. The sample not only includes workers in regular employment, but also
employees in vocational training, marginal employment, or partial retirement schemes.
In contrast to earlier GSES waves and to the IAB linked employer-employee data set
(LIAB), wages are neither truncated nor censored so that lower and upper parts of the
wage distribution can be analyzed precisely. Moreover, and most importantly for our
study, collective bargaining coverage is recorded for each of the individuals, and not only
at the firm level as, e. g., in the LIAB. GSES data are gathered from firms’ official report-
ing obligations. Therefore, they are more reliable than information from individual-level
surveys or data not covered by duties of disclosure (Jacobebbinghaus 2002).
The GSES 2001 has only recently been made available for research. So far, analyses
with GSES data have been restricted to administrative use or to regional subsamples
membership propensities.
5Cardoso and Portugal (2005) refer to this gap as “wage cushion” (p. 877) in order to distinguish it
from the notion of wage drift, which traditionally focusses on the change of the gap.
4
(cf. Fitzenberger and Reize (2002, 2003) and the studies cited in section 2). See Hafner
(2005) and Statistisches Bundesamt (2000, 2004) for descriptions of the data set. Details
on the on-site-use version employed in this study and our selection of data are provided
in the appendix.
We consider male full-time, female full-time, and female part-time employees and
distinguish between blue-collar and white-collar workers and between East and West
Germany. Our analysis focusses on the distribution of log hourly wages in three regimes
of bargaining coverage:
• CC: collective contract negotiated between an employers’ association and a union.
• FC: firm-level contract negotiated between a firm and a union or a works council.
• IC: individual contracts negotiated between employer and employee.
Table 1 displays the shares of employees in the respective labor market groups covered
by the different bargaining regimes. The numbers are broadly in line with those reported
by other studies using different data sets, but—ranging between 28 and 61%—collective
coverage rates differ considerably between different types of employees.6 Coverage is
generally lower in East Germany than in the West.7 In comparison to females, male
workers exhibit higher coverage rates among blue-collars, but lower rates among white-
collars. Coverage among white-collar workers is usually higher than among blue-collar
workers, with the notable exception of male full-time workers in West Germany. For this
traditional core group we observe the highest coverage rate of 61%. Firm-level agreements
are not applied as often as collective agreements, but again the share of covered employees
varies between 4% and 13% across types of employees.
4 Wage Distributions by Bargaining Regime
4.1 Unconditional Distributions
Table 2 reports means and standard deviations of log hourly wages by bargaining regimes
for the different labor market groups. The overall picture meets a priori expectations.
However, there are noteworthy differences between groups regarding both wage levels and
wage dispersion.
Average wages are in most cases highest under firm-level contracts, closely followed by
collective contracts, and both FC and CC leaving individually negotiated wages behind.
6Kohaut and Schnabel (2003a) and Schnabel (2005) report differences by industries and establishment
size, respectively. However, none of these studies differentiates by labor market subgroups.
7Only for the group of female part-time employees, the East-West difference is basically negligible.
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Yet there is the notable exception of male full-time white-collar workers in West Germany,
for whom the average of wages set in individual contracts is highest. So even though we
have excluded white-collar workers in the highest professional status category (leitende
Angestellte), employees payed above the agreed scale rate (außertarifliche Angestellte)
have a pronounced effect on the wage level. As expected, higher wages are paid in West
Germany as compared to the East, for men as compared to women, and for full-time
employees as compared to part-timers.
Overall wage dispersion is generally highest among individual contracts, but again
we find diverse patterns. Considering white-collars, dispersion is higher among firm-
level agreements than among collective contracts in West Germany, but the ranking is
reversed in the East. In total though, differences between East and West Germany are
small. Dispersion among blue-collar workers is generally lower than among white-collars.
East German blue-collar workers even face lowest overall dispersion when being paid
according to individual contracts.
Mean and standard deviation are only insufficient measures of the distributions if
there are categorization effects leading to multiple peaks or if the different bargaining
regimes have asymmetric impacts, such as predicted by a minimum-wage argument for
collective wages. We therefore estimate the densities fr(yr) of log wages yr ≡ ln(wr) in
regimes r by means of nonparametric kernel density estimation:
fˆh(y) =
1
Nh
N∑
i=1
K
(
y − yi
h
)
, (1)
where i = 1, ..., N denotes individuals and the index r is omitted for notational simplic-
ity. We employ an Epanechnikov kernel K(·) and choose the bandwidth h according to
Silverman’s (1986) rule of thumb.
By and large, our findings in figure 1 match those in the related literature, with
densities of individual wages being located to the left of the densities of collective and
firm-level agreements, and IC densities showing higher variances and more mass at the
tails. For most groups, the shape of the FC density is more similar to that of CC than
to the shape of the IC density. Evidence regarding the skewness of the distributions is
mixed, though. We find no clear support for the hypothesis that lower wage brackets in
collective and firm-level agreements form strong wage floors and compress the distribution
from below. Moreover, there are important differences between labor market groups. For
example, there are notable categorization effects among part-time workers with collective
or firm-level contracts, as well as among full-time blue-collar women in East Germany. For
these groups, the distributions show very pronounced or even multiple peaks, indicating
that employees are selected into certain wage brackets which are similar across firms and
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occupations.8 We also find that the high average of IC wages among the large group of
male white-collar workers in West Germany is supported by a less clear-cut mode and
relatively high mass in the upper half of the distribution, even though there is also a long
left tail.
In order to approach the nature of wage dispersion underlying the observed distribu-
tions, we decompose the variance of log hourly wages for each regime into within and
between-firm effects:
J∑
j=1
Nj∑
i=1
(yij − y¯)
2 =
J∑
j=1
Nj∑
i=1
(yij − y¯j)
2 +
J∑
j=1
Nj(y¯j − y¯)
2, (2)
where yij denotes the log hourly wage of individual i in firm j, y¯j the mean log hourly
wage in firm j, y¯ the overall mean log hourly wage, and Nj the number of employees in
firm j.
The height of the bars in figure 2 recalls the level of overall dispersion discussed above.
With respect to the shares of within and between-dispersion, there are generally little
differences between the bargaining regimes, but considerable ones across groups. Whereas
variation within and between firms both contribute equally to the dispersion among white-
collar workers, blue-collar workers—and in particular those in East Germany—exhibit
a disproportionately large share of between-firm effects. While highlighting again the
existence of heterogeneity across groups, these findings also show the necessity to control
for differences between firms as well as differences between individuals within the same
firm when judging pay differentials between bargaining regimes.
4.2 Individual-Level Wage Regressions
In order to control for different selections of workers and firms into bargaining regimes in
terms of observable characteristics, we estimate flexible individual-level wage regressions
using sets of covariates fully interacted with regime indicators. As to the focus of our
analysis, this approach has two advantages. First, it allows not only the base level
of wages to vary between regimes, but also the effects of all covariates. Second, we can
subsequently analyze the distributions of the residuals in order to shed light on differences
in residual wage dispersion between the regimes.
We exploit the nature of the linked employer-employee data set and include covariates
Xij at the individual level, such as human capital variables (educational attainment,
8Alternatively, the number of observations for these groups (coming down to about 500 for part-time
blue-collar women in the East) might already be too small for nonparametric estimation, such that the
results would reflect a statistical artefact. However, the pronounced patterns rather suggest the existence
of categorization effects.
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age, tenure) and workplace-related characteristics (indicators for shift-work or work on
Sundays, etc.), as well as firm-level covariates Zj, such as size and industry of the firm
or average characteristics of the firm’s workforce:
yij = α0 + CCijα1 + FCijα2 + X˜ijβ0 + CCijX˜ijβ1 + FCijX˜ijβ2
+Z˜jγ0 + CCijZ˜jγ1 + FCijZ˜jγ2 + ǫij. (3)
As the covariates X˜ij = Xij − X¯ and Z˜j = Zj − Z¯ are included in terms of deviations
from sample means, the coefficients α1 and α2 can be interpreted as average partial
effects of collective and firm-level contracts. Estimates of these are summarized in table
4.9 Ceteris paribus, workers covered by either a collective or a firm-level agreement earn
significantly higher wages in almost all labor market groups.10 Unions (or works councils)
are thus more successful in bargaining for higher wages as compared to individual workers
themselves.11 Yet again there is a considerable degree of heterogeneity across labor market
groups. Not only do the positive APEs vary in a range between 1% and 43%, but the
APE of CC among male white-collar employees working full-time in West Germany is even
negative by the order of 2%. Employees of this prominent group in fact receive a premium
if they do not subject themselves to collective contracts. So the larger share of employees
payed above the agreed scale rate (außertarifliche Angestellte) has a pronounced effect
on the wage level net of all observable individual and firm-level controls.12
Evidence on the ranking of CC and FC premia is mainly inconclusive, but in most
cases the two are close to each other. With the exception of the group of female part-
time workers in East Germany—for whom the estimation is generally least precise—APEs
are also similar between blue-collar and white-collar workers. However, the effects are
considerably larger in East Germany than in West Germany, and for women as compared
to men. Whereas the latter result reflects the fact that institutionalized wage setting
reduces pay differentials in general, and gender wage gaps in particular, the former result
is in line with the view that a larger number of firms in East Germany who have opted
out of collective contracts in recent years, have done explicitly so in order to set lower
wages.
9We also experimented with variants of equation (3) including only individual-level covariates Xij . In
contrast to the presented model using the rich set of covariates, these variants could be estimated with
firm-fixed effects. As it turned out, estimates do usually not differ with respect to the ranking of wages
by regime. Definitions of all employed variables are provided in table 3. Complete regression results are
available from the authors upon request.
10Only a couple of FC effects with a small absolute value do not turn out significant.
11Gu¨rtzgen (2005a, 2005b) discusses rent-sharing as a plausible explanation for related findings.
12Note again that we have excluded white-collar workers in the highest professional status category
(leitende Angestellte); cf. section 4.1. Note further that—even though being positive—the APEs of CC
and FC among male blue-collar workers in West Germany are also comparably small.
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4.3 Residual Wage Dispersion
The residuals from individual-level wage regressions provide insights into unions’ impact
on residual wage dispersion, i. e., on variation remaining after individual and firm char-
acteristics have been controlled for. In figure 3 we compare residual variances between
regimes and across groups and provide decompositions into within and between-firm
effects.13 As expected, residual wage dispersion is considerably lower than overall disper-
sion and the share of between-firm variation net of observable influences is considerably
smaller. There is a clear ranking between regimes, with individual contracts showing
the highest residual dispersion. In contrast to the case of overall dispersion, this finding
now holds for all groups, as the regressions capture the categorization effects detected
above. Unions’ impact on reducing wage dispersion shows in both collective and firm-level
bargaining.
In general, the level of residual dispersion is lower among blue-collar workers as com-
pared to white-collars, and fairly similar in East and West Germany. Yet the difference
between IC dispersion on the one hand and CC and FC dispersion on the other is more
pronounced in the East. Unions therefore have a larger impact in East Germany.
4.4 Firm-Level Wage Regressions
Finally, we compare the regimes with respect to firm-average wage levels and to wage
dispersion within firms in a firm-level regression framework. We regress the average of log
wages y¯j and the standard deviation of log wages σj , respectively, on a set of firm-level
control variables.14 This approach offers the advantage that it explicitly considers both
the wage level and wage dispersion within firms.
We specify
y¯j = α0 + SHARE CCjα1 + SHARE FCjα2 + Zjκ+ εj (4)
and
σj = δ0 + SHARE CCjδ1 + SHARE FCjδ2 + Zjλ+ νj, (5)
where SHARE CCj and SHARE FCj denote the share of workers in firm j covered by
collective and firm-level agreements, respectively.
13We use the residuals from individual wage regressions estimated separately for the three regimes.
Note that the asymptotic distribution of residuals does not reveal any skewness or kurtosis effects by
construction. Residual kernel density estimates reported in figure 4 corroborate this notion.
14We include shares for variables which are discrete at the individual level, and mean values for
continuous ones.
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The results in table 5 reveal significant mark-ups for both collective and firm-level
bargaining coverage. Differences between collective and firm-level agreements are of minor
importance, but again there is notable heterogeneity across groups. For example, a change
from zero to full CC (FC) coverage would increase wages by 2% (3%) for male blue-collar
workers in West Germany, but by 24% (22%) for part-time working white-collar women
in the East. The effects are considerably larger in East Germany than in West Germany,
for women as compared to men, and for white-collar workers compared to blue-collar
workers.
The impacts measured at the firm level thus coincide with the impacts estimated at the
individual level for most labor market groups. However, the firm-level regressions are not
sufficient for detecting—in particular—the subtle differences for the group of male white-
collar workers in West Germany because they do not capture selection effects to the same
degree. As not only firms take the decision whether to apply collective contracts at all, but
also individuals within firms select themselves based on their personal characteristics, it
is in fact important to consider the individual level (cf. Fitzenberger, Kohn, and Lembcke
2007).
Regarding firm-level wage dispersion, both collective and firm-level coverage show neg-
ative signs, even though only the effects for male blue-collar workers turn out significant.
Being in line with the patterns revealed above, these results meet a priori expectations.
5 Concluding Remarks
This paper studies the wage structure in three wage-setting regimes prevalent in the
German system of industrial relations. Using newly available linked employer-employee
data from the German Structure of Earnings Survey (GSES) 2001, we look at various
groups in the labor market in order to analyze unions’ impact through collective and
firm-level bargaining on the structure of wages.
By and large, our findings meet a priori expectations. The impact of wage bargaining
mainly works towards a higher wage level and reduced overall, firm-level, and residual
wage dispersion. Yet there is no clear evidence for disproportionate wage compression
from below or wage floors formed by collectively bargained low wage brackets which
would operate as minimum wages for different groups of workers. Moreover, we detect
considerable heterogeneity in the impacts across different labor market groups as well
as subtle differences between individual and firm-level evidence. As a robust result, the
effects of wage bargaining are stronger in East Germany as compared to the West, and
for women as compared to men. On average, male white-collar workers in West Germany
earn highest wages when not covered by a collective contract.
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There is a number of interesting issues for future research arising from our analysis.
First of all, differences regarding the returns to human capital and other individual and
firm-level characteristics should be analyzed in order to answer the question who gains
most from collective bargaining. Second, the choice of a bargaining regime is clearly
endogenous. Selection of individuals driven by observable characteristics would con-
tribute to explaining the revealed differences between individual and firm-level evidence.
However, it is not possible to control for selection based on unobservable individual or
match-specific effects, and therefore the results should be taken as descriptive rather
than causal. As finding valid instruments for collective coverage generally proves intri-
cate, using a matching technique as in Card and de la Rica (2006) would be a promising
approach. Third, as the GSES wave 1995 is scheduled to be made available for research,
future studies might take account of variations over time. Fourth, applying quantile re-
gressions as in Fitzenberger, Kohn, and Lembcke (2007) or Bechtel (2006) would promise
additional insights. Fifth, and finally, unions’ impacts on the structure of wages and on
employment should be analyzed simultaneously.
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Table 1: Wage-Setting Regimes: Coverage Shares and Sample Sizes
White-Collar
regime Male Full-T. West Male Full-T. East Female Full-T. West Female Full-T. East Female Part-T. West Female Part-T. East
CC 0.505 0.363 0.557 0.437 0.518 0.506
FC 0.062 0.092 0.056 0.084 0.041 0.065
IC 0.433 0.545 0.387 0.479 0.441 0.429
N 148.909 21.515 80.361 20.364 41.704 7.175
Blue-Collar
regime Male Full-T. West Male Full-T. East Female Full-T. West Female Full-T. East Female Part-T. West Female Part-T. East
CC 0.605 0.324 0.524 0.282 0.409 0.386
FC 0.081 0.066 0.103 0.130 0.074 0.073
IC 0.314 0.610 0.373 0.588 0.517 0.541
N 214.988 54.342 34.385 13.057 35.827 6.990
Shares of employees covered by different regimes, accounting for sampling weights. Numbers of observations by labor market groups. Data source: GSES 2001.
12
Table 2: Wage Level and Dispersion by Wage-Setting Regimes
White-Collar
Male Full-T. West Male Full-T. East Female Full-T. West Female Full-T. East Female Part-T. West Female Part-T. East
regime mean std. dev. mean std. dev. mean std. dev. mean std. dev. mean std. dev. mean std. dev.
CC 3.001 0.296 2.808 0.297 2.722 0.289 2.567 0.300 2.601 0.347 2.365 0.326
FC 2.990 0.341 2.764 0.270 2.756 0.298 2.656 0.261 2.704 0.365 2.463 0.374
IC 3.045 0.391 2.675 0.398 2.660 0.383 2.284 0.361 2.363 0.496 1.992 0.388
total 3.019 0.345 2.734 0.355 2.700 0.332 2.453 0.359 2.505 0.438 2.209 0.409
Blue-Collar
Male Full-T. West Male Full-T. East Female Full-T. West Female Full-T. East Female Part-T. West Female Part-T. East
regime mean std. dev. mean std. dev. mean std. dev. mean std. dev. mean std. dev. mean std. dev.
CC 2.686 0.222 2.443 0.241 2.451 0.238 2.250 0.268 2.229 0.273 1.987 0.349
FC 2.704 0.247 2.407 0.278 2.497 0.225 2.392 0.316 2.539 0.268 2.420 0.337
IC 2.505 0.264 2.187 0.239 2.253 0.247 1.951 0.248 2.063 0.295 1.766 0.314
total 2.632 0.253 2.298 0.273 2.385 0.260 2.104 0.321 2.178 0.319 1.925 0.393
Log gross hourly wages (Euro) and corresponding standard deviations. Data source: GSES 2001.
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Table 3: Definition of Variables
Label Description
Individual Level
AGE Age in years/10.
AGESQ AGE squared.
TENURE Tenure in years/10.
TENURESQ TENURE squared.
LOW EDUC Low level of education: no training beyond a school degree (or no school degree
at all).
MED EDUC Intermediate level of education: vocational training.
HIGH EDUC High level of education: university or technical college degree.
NA EDUC Missing information on the level of education.
BC STAT1 Blue-collar worker, professional status category 1: vocationally trained or com-
parably experienced worker with special skills and highly involved tasks.
BC STAT2 Blue-collar worker, professional status category 2: vocationally trained or com-
parably experienced worker.
BC STAT3 Blue-collar worker, professional status category 3: worker trained on-the-job.
BC STAT4 Blue-collar worker, professional status category 4: laborer.
WC STAT2 White-collar worker, professional status category 2: executive employee with
limited procuration.
WC STAT3 White-collar worker, professional status category 3: employee with special skills
or experience who works on his own responsibility on highly involved or complex
tasks.
WC STAT4 White-collar worker, professional status category 4: vocationally trained or
comparably experienced employee who works autonomously on involved tasks.
WC STAT5 White-collar worker, professional status category 5: vocationally trained or
comparably experienced employee working autonomously.
WC STAT6 White-collar worker, professional status category 6: employee working on sim-
ple tasks.
NIGHT Individual worked night shifts.
SUNDAY Individual worked on Sundays or on holidays.
SHIFT Individual worked shift.
OVERTIME Individual worked overtime.
Firm Level
S FEM Share of female employees.
S AGE1 Share of employees of age 20 or younger.
S AGE2 Share of employees of age 21–25.
S AGE3 Share of employees of age 26–30.
S AGE4 Share of employees of age 31–35.
S AGE5 Share of employees of age 36–40.
S AGE6 Share of employees of age 41–45.
S AGE7 Share of employees of age 46–50.
S AGE8 Share of employees of age 51–55.
S AGE9 Share of employees of age 56–60.
S AGE10 Share of employees of age 61 or older.
S TENURE1 Share of employees with less than 1 year of tenure.
S TENURE2 Share of employees with 1–2 years of tenure.
S TENURE3 Share of employees with 3–5 years of tenure.
S TENURE4 Share of employees with 6–10 years of tenure.
S TENURE5 Share of employees with 11–15 years of tenure.
Continued on next page...
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... table 3 continued
Label Description
S TENURE6 Share of employees with 16–20 years of tenure.
S TENURE7 Share of employees with 21–25 years of tenure.
S TENURE8 Share of employees with 26–30 years of tenure.
S TENURE9 Share of employees with 31 or more years of tenure.
S LOW EDUC Share of employees with LOW EDUC.
S MED EDUC Share of employees with MED EDUC.
S HIGH EDUC Share of employees with HIGH EDUC.
S NA EDUC Share of employees with NA EDUC.
HOURSWORKED Average hours worked in the firm.
S IRREG Share of employees for whom any of NIGHT, SUNDAY, or SHIFT applies.
S OVERTIME Share of employees working overtime.
S BC Share of blue-collar workers.
S NOT FT Share of employees who do not work full-time.
FIRMSIZE1 Firm has between 10 and 49 employees.
FIRMSIZE2 Firm has between 50 and 249 employees.
FIRMSIZE3 Firm has between 250 and 499 employees.
FIRMSIZE4 Firm has between 500 and 999 employees.
FIRMSIZE5 Firm has between 1000 and 1999 employees.
FIRMSIZE6 Firm has 2000 or more employees.
SECTOR1 Mining and quarrying (NACE: 10–14)
SECTOR2 Manufacture of food products, beverages and tobacco (NACE: 15–16)
SECTOR3 Manufacture of textiles and textile products; leather and leather products
(NACE: 17–19)
SECTOR4 Manufacture of wood and wood products; pulp, paper and paper products
(NACE: 20–21)
SECTOR5 Publishing, printing and reproduction of recorded media (NACE: 22)
SECTOR6 Manufacture of coke, refined petroleum products and nuclear fuel; chemicals
and chemical products (NACE: 23–24)
SECTOR7 Manufacture of rubber and plastic products (NACE: 25)
SECTOR8 Manufacture of other non-metallic mineral products (NACE: 26)
SECTOR9 Manufacture of basic metals; fabricated metal products, except from machinery
and equipment (NACE: 27–28)
SECTOR10 Manufacture of machinery and equipment n.e.c. (NACE: 29)
SECTOR11 Manufacture of electrical machinery and apparatus n.e.c. (NACE: 31)
SECTOR12 Manufacture of electrical and optical equipment; radio, television, and commu-
nication equipment and apparatus (NACE: 30 + 32)
SECTOR13 Manufacture of medical, precision and optical instruments, watches and clocks
(NACE: 33)
SECTOR14 Manufacture of transport equipment (NACE: 34–35)
SECTOR15 Manufacture n.e.c. (NACE: 36–37)
SECTOR16 Electricity, gas and water supply (NACE: 40–41)
SECTOR17 Construction (NACE: 45)
SECTOR18 Sale, maintenance and repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles; retail sale of
automotive fuel (NACE: 50)
SECTOR19 Wholesale trade and commission trade except of motor vehicles and motorcy-
cles (NACE: 51)
SECTOR20 Retail trade, except from motor vehicles and motorcycles; repair of personal
and household goods (NACE: 52)
SECTOR21 Hotels and restaurants (NACE: 55)
SECTOR22 Land transport; transport via pipelines; air transport (NACE: 60 + 62)
SECTOR23 Water transport (NACE: 61)
Continued on next page...
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... table 3 continued
Label Description
SECTOR24 Supporting and auxiliary transport activities; activities of travel agencies
(NACE: 63)
SECTOR25 Post and telecommunications (NACE: 64)
SECTOR26 Financial intermediation, except from insurance and pension funding; activi-
ties auxiliary to financial intermediation, except from insurance and pension
funding (NACE: 65 + 67.1)
SECTOR27 Insurance and pension funding, except compulsory social security; activities
auxiliary to insurance and pension funding (NACE: 66 + 67.2)
SECTOR28 Real estate activities; renting of machinery and equipment without operator
and of personal and household goods (NACE: 70–71)
SECTOR29 Computer and related activities (NACE: 72)
SECTOR30 Research and development; other business activities (NACE: 73–74)
PUBLIC1 Firm is privately owned.
PUBLIC2 Firm is partly public-owned (<50%).
PUBLIC3 Firm is mainly public-owned (>50%).
REGION1 Firm is located in Schleswig-Holstein or Hamburg.
REGION2 Firm is located in Lower Saxony or Bremen.
REGION3 Firm is located in North Rhine-Westphalia.
REGION4 Firm is located in Hesse.
REGION5 Firm is located in Rhineland-Palatinate or Saarland.
REGION6 Firm is located in Baden-Wu¨rttemberg.
REGION7 Firm is located in Bavaria.
REGION9 Firm is located in Brandenburg or Mecklenburg-West Pomerania.
REGION10 Firm is located in Saxony.
REGION11 Firm is located in Saxony-Anhalt.
REGION12 Firm is located in Thuringia.
Data source: GSES 2001.
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Table 4: Individual-Level Wage Regressions
White-Collar
Male Full-T. West Male Full-T. East Female Full-T. West Female Full-T. East Female Part-T. West Female Part-T. East
regime coef. std. err. coef. std. err. coef. std. err. coef. std. err. coef. std. err. coef. std. err.
CC -0.020∗∗ (0.005) 0.073∗∗ (0.011) 0.050∗∗ (0.005) 0.137∗∗ (0.012) 0.135∗∗ (0.011) 0.277∗∗ (0.020)
FC -0.011 (0.009) 0.011 (0.015) 0.071∗∗ (0.009) 0.134∗∗ (0.016) 0.167∗∗ (0.016) 0.425∗∗ (0.034)
Blue-Collar
Male Full-T. West Male Full-T. East Female Full-T. West Female Full-T. East Female Part-T. West Female Part-T. East
regime coef. std. err. coef. std. err. coef. std. err. coef. std. err. coef. std. err. coef. std. err.
CC 0.010∗ (0.005) 0.095∗∗ (0.011) 0.112∗∗ (0.009) 0.145∗∗ (0.019) 0.117∗∗ (0.012) 0.149∗∗ (0.032)
FC 0.008 (0.010) 0.014 (0.015) 0.098∗∗ (0.013) 0.162∗∗ (0.020) 0.089∗∗ (0.026) 0.022 (0.057)
Log gross hourly wages. Average partial effects of collective and firm-level contracts estimated by OLS regressions including full sets of individual- and
firm-level covariates, interacted with regime indicators, and accounting for sampling weights. (Firm-level) clustered standard errors in parentheses. ∗/ ∗∗
indicate significance at 5% / 1% level. Data source: GSES 2001.
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Table 5: Firm-Level Regressions
Mean Log Hourly Wage
Male Full-T. West Male Full-T. East Female Full-T. West Female Full-T. East Female Part-T. West Female Part-T. East
White-Collar coef. std. err. coef. std. err. coef. std. err. coef. std. err. coef. std. err. coef. std. err.
CC 0.066∗∗ (0.005) 0.198∗∗ (0.011) 0.099∗∗ (0.005) 0.216∗∗ (0.011) 0.113∗∗ (0.008) 0.241∗∗ (0.021)
FC 0.061∗∗ (0.007) 0.154∗∗ (0.018) 0.102∗∗ (0.008) 0.187∗∗ (0.018) 0.115∗∗ (0.015) 0.217∗∗ (0.041)
Blue-Collar
CC 0.021∗∗ (0.004) 0.100∗∗ (0.009) 0.079∗∗ (0.007) 0.152∗∗ (0.013) 0.092∗∗ (0.008) 0.191∗∗ (0.022)
FC 0.037∗∗ (0.007) 0.080∗∗ (0.016) 0.078∗∗ (0.012) 0.113∗∗ (0.024) 0.108∗∗ (0.015) 0.159∗∗ (0.035)
Std. Dev. Log Hourly Wage
Male Full-T. West Male Full-T. East Female Full-T. West Female Full-T. East Female Part-T. West Female Part-T. East
White-Collar coef. std. err. coef. std. err. coef. std. err. coef. std. err. coef. std. err. coef. std. err.
CC -0.004 (0.003) 0.001 (0.007) -0.003 (0.004) -0.010 (0.008) -0.005 (0.008) -0.006 (0.022)
FC -0.008 (0.005) 0.001 (0.011) -0.020∗∗ (0.006) -0.019 (0.011) -0.014 (0.012) -0.040 (0.030)
Blue-Collar
CC -0.014∗∗ (0.002) -0.011∗∗ (0.003) -0.010∗ (0.004) -0.009 (0.006) -0.005 (0.006) -0.013 (0.015)
FC -0.006 (0.003) -0.009 (0.005) -0.004 (0.007) -0.008 (0.009) 0.024 (0.012) 0.000 (0.027)
Partial effects of collective and firm-level contracts, estimated by OLS regressions including full sets of firm-level covariates, accounting for sampling weights.
Robust standard errors in parentheses. ∗/ ∗∗ indicate significance at 5% / 1% level. Data source: GSES 2001.
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Table 6: Sectors Sampled with the GSES 2001
European German
NACE Sector Regulation Law Data
C-F Industry yes yes yes
G Wholesale and Retail Trade yes yes yes
H Hotels and Restaurants yes no yes
I Transport, Storage and Communication yes no yes
J Financial Intermediation yes yes yes
K Real Estate, Renting and Business Activities yes no yes
M Education opt no no
N Health and Social Work opt no no
O Other Community, Social, and Personal Service Ac-
tivities
opt no no
yes: required sector; no: sector to be left out; opt: inclusion of sector optional.
Sectors not mentioned are excluded under both regulations.
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Figure 1: Unconditional Wage Distributions
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Kernel density estimates: log gross hourly wages. Data source: GSES 2001.
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Figure 2: Unconditional Variance Decompositions
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Variance decomposition: log gross hourly wages. Data source: GSES 2001.
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Figure 3: Residual Variance Decompositions
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Variance decomposition: residuals from individual-level wage regressions. Data source: GSES 2001.
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Figure 4: Residual Wage Distributions
Male Full-T. White-C. West Male Full-T. White-C. East Male Full-T. Blue-C. West Male Full-T. Blue-C. East
0
.
5
1
1
.
5
2
2
.
5
k
d
e
n
s
i
t
y
 
r
e
s
i
d
s
−2 −1 0 1 2
x
CC FC
IC
0
1
2
3
4
k
d
e
n
s
i
t
y
 
r
e
s
i
d
s
−2 −1 0 1
x
CC FC
IC
0
1
2
3
k
d
e
n
s
i
t
y
 
r
e
s
i
d
s
−2 −1 0 1 2
x
CC FC
IC
0
1
2
3
4
k
d
e
n
s
i
t
y
 
r
e
s
i
d
s
−2 −1 0 1
x
CC FC
IC
Female Full-T. White-C. West Female Full-T. White-C. East Female Full-T. Blue-C. West Female Full-T. Blue-C. East
0
1
2
3
k
d
e
n
s
i
t
y
 
r
e
s
i
d
s
−2 −1 0 1 2
x
CC FC
IC
0
1
2
3
4
k
d
e
n
s
i
t
y
 
r
e
s
i
d
s
−1 −.5 0 .5 1 1.5
x
CC FC
IC
0
1
2
3
k
d
e
n
s
i
t
y
 
r
e
s
i
d
s
−2 −1 0 1
x
CC FC
IC
0
1
2
3
4
5
k
d
e
n
s
i
t
y
 
r
e
s
i
d
s
−1.5 −1 −.5 0 .5 1
x
CC FC
IC
Female Part-T. White-C. West Female Part-T. White-C. East Female Part-T. Blue-C. West Female Part-T. Blue-C. East
0
1
2
3
k
d
e
n
s
i
t
y
 
r
e
s
i
d
s
−2 −1 0 1 2
x
CC FC
IC
0
1
2
3
k
d
e
n
s
i
t
y
 
r
e
s
i
d
s
−2 −1 0 1 2
x
CC FC
IC
0
1
2
3
4
k
d
e
n
s
i
t
y
 
r
e
s
i
d
s
−2 −1 0 1 2
x
CC FC
IC
0
1
2
3
4
k
d
e
n
s
i
t
y
 
r
e
s
i
d
s
−2 −1 0 1 2
x
CC FC
IC
Kernel density estimates: Residuals from individual-level wage regressions. Data source: GSES 2001.
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A German Structure of Earnings Survey 2001
The German Structure of Earnings Survey (GSES, Gehalts- und Lohnstrukturerhebung)
2001 is a linked employer-employee data set administered by the German Statistical Of-
fice subject to European law (European Council Regulation (EC) No 530/1999, amended
by EC 1916/2000) as well as to German law (Law on Wage Statistics, LohnStatG). It
is a sample of all firms in manufacturing and private service sectors with at least ten
employees; see table 6 for a synopsis of sectors sampled. Sampling takes place at the firm
or establishment level.15 At a first stage, firms are randomly drawn at the Federal State
level, where the sampling probability varies between 5.3% for the largest state (North
Rhine-Westphalia) and 19.4% for the smallest (Bremen). Following a procedure for com-
parable precision, the resulting standard deviation of gross wages in the smallest Federal
State is about twice the standard deviation in the largest State; see Krug, Nourney, and
Schmidt (2001) and Statistisches Bundesamt (2004). At the second stage, employees
are randomly chosen from the firms sampled at the first stage. The share of employees
sampled depends upon the firm size and ranges between 6.25% for the largest firms and
100% for firms with less than 20 employees. The data set provides sampling weights.
The GSES 2001 is available for on-site use at Research Centers of the Federal States’
Statistical Offices (FDZ) since the year 2005. This study uses an anonymized use-file
which includes all firms and employees form the original data except for one firm in
Berlin (the only firm in Berlin falling into NACE section C). Regional information is
condensed to 12 “states”, and some industries have been aggregated at the two-digit
level. Overall, the use-file consists of 22,040 sites with 846,156 sampled employees.
We focus on employees aged 16–65 years. Employees in vocational training, interns,
and employees subject to partial retirement schemes are left out because compensation for
these groups does not follow the regular compensation schedule, but special regulations
or even special collective bargaining agreements do apply. We also exclude white-collar
workers in the highest professional status category (category 1) who can reasonably be
expected to pursue management objectives and whose wages are hardly in the focus
of collective wage setting. Individuals who worked less than 90% of their contractual
working hours in October 2001 and individuals paid subject to a collective contract with
a missing identification number for the agreement are dropped. Part-time and full-time
employees are distinguished based on the employer’s assessment recorded in the GSES.
For blue-collar workers, actual working time and not contractual working time is relevant
for monthly payments. We exclude individuals with an actual working time of more
than 390 hours in October 2001. We analyze gross hourly wages including premia. This
15Throughout this paper, we use the terms firm, establishment, and company site synonymously.
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measure is more appropriate than wages without premia if premia are paid on a regular
basis. A lower bound of one euro is imposed for hourly wages.
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